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REVIEWS
jurisprudence became an occult science and its professors 'the most unlearned
kind of most learned men.' -0 Against such a fate the reading and rereading
of Maitland may protect lawyer and student alike. By studying what he wrote
and above all how he wrote it, they may avoid the accusation he directed
against the post-Edwardian judges and lawyers who "knew their own busi-
ness very thoroughly, and they knew nothing else. Law was now divorced
from literature; no one attempted to write a book about it."" Happily, many
books on the law are being written today, but only seldom does one reveal
the art of a Maitland.
WILLIAM HUSE DUNHAM, JR.t
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PROFESSOR Riker presents his study of the National Guard as a contribu-
tion to the theory of federalism in American government. The subject is
well chosen, for, as he points out, defense is one of the gravest problems of
federal government, and the militia "is the only area in which the nation
and the states have attempted to work together throughout most of our his-
tory."' In a compact and suggestive monograph of 117 pages, the author
examines the central question whether federalism as a system of joint ad-
ministration is worth the inefficiency which it occasions.
The author's answer is a qualified but resounding "No." It is furthermore
a conclusion which he suggests has implications for other fields of joint
federal-state administration in this age of technological and social complexi-
ties. Surveying the history of the militia from the eighteenth century to the
present, Riker concludes that the militia and its modern successor, the Na-
tional Guard, have made little or no contribution to national defense. In its
most recent test, the second World War, National Guard divisions, as the
Gray Board Report of 1948 observed, required two years of training before
they were ready for combat-as much or more training than was required by
selective service divisions raised from scratch. In theory, the National Guard
is the first-line national reserve force; successive congressional enactments
since the first Dick Act of 1903 have established and elaborated that role. In
fact, the Guard, hamstrung between federal and state authorities, has in time
of emergency never been found prepared to take up the role 'Congress made
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for it. Riker quotes with approval the trenchant observations of General
Lesley McNair on the Guard's performance in World War II:
"The history of the National Guard, since its last induction into Federal
service and until sweeping reforms were made, was one of unsatisfactory
training, physical condition, discipline, morale and particularly leader-
ship . . . . When it is considered that it was necessary to make almost
100% replacement of commissioned officers with troops from the grade
of major general down through the grade of colonel and to replace an
extremely high percentage of officers of lower rank, it can be seen that
the structurie of the National Guard was pregnant [sic] with disaster for
the entire nation."1
2
Federal control of the Guard, it is true, has greatly increased since 1903.
Federal grants-in-aid to the Guard today are probably ten times the size of
appropriations by the several state legislatures for its support, and with the
increasing financial interest of the federal government has come increasingly
detailed supervision of Guard functions and training by Regular Army officers.
But federal encroachment on the various state Guards has been resisted by
state officials and, with particular success, by the powerful National Guard
Association. The result has been compromise all along the line and a militia
organization which, as the author ruefully admits, will not fit any known
theory of federalism. The Guard, Riker concludes, "can thus be regarded as
an undesired bequest from the political thought of the eighteenth century." 3
As another student of Guard affairs has observed: "It is a Frankenstein
monster created by the Constitution of the United States."
4
Why, then, the National Guard? The answer is given by General Ellard
Walsh of Minnesota, perennial president of the National Guard Association:
"The Congress has ever been our refuge and our strength."' Few lobbies
have such influence as the NGA possesses and, from the first Dick Act of
1903 to the present, the NGA has fashioned a series of unbroken political
successes on Capitol Hill. Opposed at every turn by the Army General Staff
and the Administration--"When the General Staff get together making a
study," one NGA president cried, "God help the militia!" 6(-the Guard has
won compromise victories on every issue of military organization from the
Continental Army Plan of 1916 to the National Reserve legislation of the
fifties. Its most spectacular recent triumphs have been the gaining of control
over Air National Guard units, a victory won over violent opposition of the
whole Air Force staff, and the successful avoidance of any role in Civil De-
fense, a vital defense function which the Guard is perhaps more fitted than
any other force to perform. When an assistant secretary of defense recently
suggested that the Guard be used for Home Guard and Civil Defense duties,
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President Walsh's rejoinder betrayed the vast power and confidence of NGA.
"If they want war," the General said, with reference to domestic, not foreign,
enemies, "let it begin here!
'"7
Obsolete and inefficient as a military weapon, thoroughly confused as a case
study in federalism, the National Guard remains what it has always been-
a political, not a military, phenomenon. Guard commissions and perquisites
are an integral-and from the gubernatorial point of view, a very cheap-
part of the spoils of state politics, the parochial equivalent of the "rivers and
harbors bill" on the national level. As instruments of administration, state
governments may be obsolete, as Professor Riker suggests in his conclusion.
As basic and largely autonomous units of American politics, the states are
still powerful, and the National Guard is the best proof of it. The author,
primarily concerned with the theoretical and administrative aspects of the
Guard, does not sufficiently develop the implications of this fact. Federalism
in American government has always been less a system than a harsh political
fact, indeed, a political imperative of successful, if rather inefficient, govern-
ance in a country as large and as disparate as the United States. Federalism
has administrative implications; in National Guard, as in other, affairs, how-
ever, its meaning and its reasons are basically political.
WILLIAm R. EMERSONt
INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS. By Lord [Arnold D.] McNair. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1956. Vol. I: PEACE, pp. xxvi, 380; Vol. II:
PEACE, pp. viii, 415; Vol. III: WAR AND NEUTRALITY, pp. viii, 436. $35.00.
IN these volumes, Lord McNair, long a leading English international law
professor and formerly President of the International Court of Justice, renders
an invaluable service by making available much source material on interna-
tional law as viewed by the British government. In the international law
system developed over the last several centuries, treaties and international
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influence of the Guard is revealed in an incident from the 1930's. General Milton Reckord
of Maryland, the chief NGA lobbyist, discovered that the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee contemplated a cut of $700,000 in Guard appropriations, and, adding insult to
injury, planned to spend $400,000-to be added to the Guard bill-improving Fort Sill,
Oklahoma, a Regular Army reservation. General Reckord in a speech to the NGA con-
vention in 1937 related his transactions with Senator Copeland, Chairman of the Com-
mittee: "In a respectful but firm way I indicated to him that there might be a difference
of opinion .. . and . . . we would not play ball that way .... It simply meant, gentle-
men, that we were losing $700,000 and they were adding an additional $400,000 and
charging it against us . .. . I begged and pleaded with him to delete it, and when he
would not do that, and he would not restore the $700,000, I called for assistance, and
wires and letters went all over the United States, and very quickly the response came
back to the Senators, and finally, on the floor, our $700,000 was restored." Pp. 89-90.
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